

E X C E R P T

***** a. Sorge Paves Way For USSR - German Pact: The European picture was very black in the spring of 1939. The USSR had a choice of negotiations either with the Anglo-French or the Germans. After they had learned from Sorge that the Germans had proposed to Tokyo, with the support of Ambassador General Oshima Hiroshi, an alliance directed against the USSR and Great Britain, but that the Cabinet, the navy and the Zaibatsu were all opposed to such an alliance and had blocked it, the Soviet Government itself entered into the famous, and disastrous, non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939. It will be recalled that it was the signature of this pact, securing Hitler's eastern frontier, which precipitated the second world war by the invasion of Poland.

At the time of the "Nomonhan Incident," in the summer of 1939, when the Red Army and the Japanese Kwantung Army engaged in a full-scale, local war, the Red Army was able to learn Japanese intentions. They learned what units were being dispatched from what parts of Manchuria, as well as what reinforcements would come from Japan. Above all, they learned that the Japanese Government did not intend to exploit this incident, but intended to settle it locally, and the Russians conducted themselves accordingly. Aside from his sources in Tokyo, Sorge was able to get a good on-the-spot report from de Voukelitch who as a correspondent was taken to Nomonhan as the guest of the Japanese Army. The Japanese assessment of their lessons at Nomonhan, especially their need to mechanize all their forces and develop armored divisions on the German model, was transmitted by Sorge on the basis of information gathered both by the German Embassy and by Miyagi.

Sorge sent a reliable account of Japanese output of munitions, aircraft and motorcars, along with the report on the factories making these materials as well as iron and steel on 16 February 1940. From time to time, he brought these figures up to date. In August 1941 he reported on Japanese petroleum resources, a top secret bit of information of the most vital importance in estimating both Japanese war plans and capabilities. He reported that there was in storage in Japan sufficient petroleum for a two year's use by the navy, half a year by the army and half a year by the nation at large. His sources were the German Embassy and Miyagi.

E X C E R P T

***** a. Sorge Pales Way For USSR - German Pact: The European picture was very black in the spring of 1939. The USSR had a choice of negotiations either with the Anglo-French or the Germans. After they had learned from Sorge that the Germans had proposed to Tokyo, with the support of Ambassador General Oshima Hiroshi, an alliance directed against the USSR and Great Britain, but that the Cabinet, the navy and the Zaibatsu were all opposed to such an alliance and had blocked it, the Soviet Government itself entered into the famous, and disastrous, non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany in August 1939. It will be recalled that it was the signature of this pact, securing Hitler's eastern frontier, which precipitated the second world war by the invasion of Poland.

At the time of the "Nomonhan Incident," in the summer of 1939, when the Red Army and the Japanese Kwantung Army engaged in a full-scale, local war, the Red Army was able to learn Japanese intentions. They learned what units were being dispatched from what parts of Manchuria, as well as what reinforcements would come from Japan. Above all, they learned that the Japanese Government did not intend to exploit this incident, but intended to settle it locally, and the Russians conducted themselves accordingly. Aside from his sources in Tokyo, Sorge was able to get a good on-the-spot report from de Voukelitch who as a correspondent was taken to Nomonhan as the guest of the Japanese Army. The Japanese assessment of their lessons at Nomonhan, especially their need to mechanize all their forces and develop armored divisions on the German model, was transmitted by Sorge on the basis of information gathered both by the German Embassy and by Miyagi.

Sorge sent a reliable account of Japanese output of munitions, aircraft and motorcars, along with the report on the factories making these materials as well as iron and steel on 16 February 1940. From time to time, he brought these figures up to date. In August 1941 he reported on Japanese petroleum resources, a top secret bit of information of the most vital importance in estimating both Japanese war plans and capabilities. He reported that there was in storage in Japan sufficient petroleum for a two year's use by the navy, half a year by the army and half a year by the nation at large. His sources were the German Embassy and Miyagi.

1941 was the crucial year. After earlier general reports, on 20 May 1941, Sorge flashed the urgent warning that the Reichswehr would concentrate from 170 to 190 divisions on the Soviet border, and on 20 June would attack along the whole frontier. The main direction of the drive would be toward Moscow. It will be recalled that this attack did occur on 22 June. Naturally, thereafter, the answer to the question of Japanese attack from the east became the most vital mission of the Sorge ring. All questions, whether of Japanese-American relations, the war in China or internal politics were subordinated to answering that basic question. Without a sound answer the Red Army could not draw on their Far Eastern Army for use in the west, and, as the event showed, only a massing of limitless reserves made possible the stopping of the violent German thrusts.

Sorge could not come by the answer immediately, partly because it had not been decided definitely by the responsible Japanese authorities.. Naturally, Ambassador Ott was urging the Japanese to enter the war and distract the Russians on their eastern frontier. Sorge was able to report on 2 July, immediately after the Imperial Council of that date, that the Japanese Government had decided to push southward into French Indo-China and seize various bases. Meanwhile, while adhering to their neutrality treaty with the USSR, in view of the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, they would mobilize their whole forces. Late in July Sorge reported that a few troops from the Tokyo-Osaka areas had been sent south, but that to advance into Thailand and Malaya they needed 300,000 men. So far there were only 40,000 men in Indo-China.***

(Pages 49-50)

源 洋

一九三九年のソルゲ、ソ連の状況は暗黒たるものがあつた。

Def. Doc. 5000

ソルゲは英米の援助のいづれかと協定を結ぶ意思を持つてゐた。ソ連はソルゲから獨逸は日本の獨逸駐米大使大島將軍の支持の下にソ連及び英米の援助を阻止したといふことの通報を受けた後、ソ連政府自身海軍及び陸軍が之を阻止したといふことの通報を受けた後、ソ連政府自身宣言をとして災害を避らした。ナチ獨逸との不可侵條約を締結した。此の條約の締結がヒットラーの東方祖國を確保し遂に獨逸をポーランド侵略による第二次世界大戦にかり立てることを吾々は阻止するものである。

坂 洋

一九三九年の歐洲の状況は暗澹たるものがあつた。

ソルゲは英米の獨逸のいづれかと協定を結ぶ選擇を待つてゐた。

彼はソルゲから獨逸は日本の獨逸駐米大使大島將軍の支持の下に

ソルゲ及英米に抵抗する同盟を締結する申入れを東京政府に爲したが

英米及獨逸が之を阻止したといふことの通報を受けた後ソルゲ政府自身

を名をせして災害を齎らした。ナチ獨逸との不可侵條約を締結した。

此の條約の締結がヒットラーの東方覇權を確保し遂に獨逸をボーラ

ンド侵略による第二次世界大戦にかり立てることを吾々は恐るべき

のである。

Def. Doc. 4002

2.

ソージは一九四〇年二月十六日日本の軍需品、航空機、及び自動車製造高に關する責任ある記事を、鐵、銅鐵並びに上記の材料を生産せる工場に關する報告書と共に送つた。彼は屢々此等の數字を時宜に遞するものとした。一九四一年八月日本の戦争計畫、戦争能力を知る上に最も重大なる極秘の情報である日本の石油資源に關して報告した。彼は日本には海軍に於いて二年間陸軍に於いて半年間國民一般に於いて半年間使用するだけの石油が貯藏してある事を報告した。

彼の情報の出所は獨逸大使館並びに宮城であつた。

一九四一年は決定的な年であつた。
一九四一年五月二十日の早期一般報告の後、ゾルゲから、ドイツ國防軍はソヴィエト國境に一七〇乃至一九〇師團を集結し、而して六月二十日には全戰線につて攻撃の舉に出づるであらう。(そして主としてモスコの方角へ向つて進撃するであらう)といふ至急警告が打電された。
事實この攻撃が六月二十二日に發生したことを想出されるであらう。そこで自然、東方からの日本軍の攻撃に關する問題の答をうることにゾルゲ一黨にとつて最も重大な使命となつてきたのであつた。

日米關係のことであらうと中國に於ける戦争又は國內の政治に關することであらうと、他の總ての問題はこの根本問題の答を得て後の問題であつた。この問題の完全な答を得ずしては亦年はその結果を西方に彌すことは出来なかつた。そして畢竟か示してゐるやうに、無数の預備兵を集合することによつてドイツの熾烈な笑入を喰止めることか出来たのであつた。

ゾルゲはすぐには返答をうけえなかつた。それは一つにはこの問
 題が未だ責任ある日本間邊の最終的な決定を経てゐなかつたため
 もあつた。オットー大使は勿論日本側を動かして参戦させ、ソヴィ
 エト軍をその東部戦線において擾亂させるやうに奔走してゐた。遂
 に七月二日、その日行はれた御前會議の直後、ゾルゲは日本政府が
 印に南進して幾つかの基地を占領することに決定した旨を報告す
 ることができた。またソ聯との中立條約を守る一万、對ソ戦の可能
 性にかんがみ日本はその全力を動員するであらうと考へられた。

ref. 0000007

七月末ゾルゲは東京及び大阪地區から若干の部隊が南方に送られたが、タイ及びマレーに進撃するためには三十萬の兵力を要する旨を述べた。その當時印度支那駐屯兵力は四萬に過ぎなかつた。

(卷四九一五〇頁)